One week after the terrorist attacks in Spain the mental health authorities announced an epidemic of PTSD. 1 Under the headline ' Marked for ever' the newspaper El Mundo (21 March, 2004 ) stated: 'The authorities expect that between 3 and 6% of the population of Madrid will have severe psychological disorders (between 90.000 and 180.000 persons)' . El Pa|¤ s, the main newspaper in Spain, with more than two million readers in the weekend edition, gave similar ¢gures (Sampedro, 2004) : '. . . damage is not only to be expected in the town. The di¡usion of the images of the bombings and the reactions of victims and relatives makes all Spain vulnerable to the consequences of terrorism' . What is the impact of critical incidents, natural and man-made disasters, in the general population? How should the government respond to it? These questions are the subjects of an intense debate in newspapers, magazines, television programmes and scienti¢c literature (Pe¤ rez-Sales, Cervello¤ n, Va¤ zquez, Vidales & Gaborit, 2005) . One approach states that governments should screen the population for clinical symptoms of psychiatric disorder and provides clinical treatment (Bryant & Harvey, 2000; Litz, Gray, Bryant & Adler,2002; Prigerson, Shear & Jacobs,1999; Nathaniel, Wolmer, Meltem, Deniz, Smadar & Yanki, 2002) . This is the strategy recommended by some of the leading institutions in the ¢eld such as the International Society forTraumatic Stress Studies CarmeloVa¤ zquez & Pau Pe¤ rez-Sales (Foa, Keane & Friedman, 2000; Ritchie, Watson & Friedman, in press) , or the USA National Center for PTSD (Leskin, Ruzek, Friedman & Gusman,1999) . Another approach puts the main focus on the breakdown of the social fabric and providing tools for community rebuilding and empowerment through capacity building. This response is advocated by a number of researchers, organizations and institutions like the World Health Organization (Van Ommeren, Saxenas & Saraceno, 2005) , the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2003) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, in press ). The purpose of our study is to analyse the applicability of the PTSD construct and its usage in population-based epidemiological studies after a collective traumatic event, as a tool for planning needs and services.
Methods to assess trauma
Researchers have used three di¡erent ways of assessing the impact of these events on the general population. The ¢rst strategy has been to use questionnaires that basically cover a number of symptoms related to traumatic stress reactions.These instruments are not intended to measure PTSD, but to assess emotional distress ('Have you felt emotionally a¡ected by the images you saw onTV?' or 'Has the terrorist attack a¡ected your daily functioning (i.e. not using public transport)?'). A second measurement strategy has been the use of self-report symptomquestionnaires that cover PTSD symptoms as de¢ned within the current, o⁄cial diagnostic systems (e.g., DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association (APA),2000) in order to estimate the amount of people su¡ering from traumatic stress disorders. Instruments such as the impact of events scale (IES) or the post-traumatic checklist-civilian version (PCL-C) are examples of this approach. The PCL-C, for instance, is a self-report instrument covering the 17 symptoms included in the de¢nition of PTSD as described in the DSM-IV-TR. Although the questionnaires do not strictly follow all the DSM-IV [American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1996] diagnostic criteria, apart from the list of symptoms, it is assumed that ¢gures of probable PTSD diagnoses can be inferred based on the participant's scores on these questionnaires. Based on previous studies, di¡erent cut-o¡ scores have been proposed, particularly for the PCL-C. A cut-o¡ score is a given test score that is hypothesized to allow a valid classi¢cation of a person as a 'psychiatric case' . Yet, there is no agreement on which is the best cut-o¡ score for, for instance, the IES or the PCL-C. Finally, a third measurement strategy is to use full diagnostic criteria to verify the presence of mental disorders (typically PTSD or acute stress disorder). In this case, to receive a diagnosis of PTSD participants must ful¢l not only PTSD symptoms (which are covered by Criteria B, C, and D according to the DSM-IV, see Table 1 ) but also the restof requirements neededto give a full diagnosis of PTSD (i.e., Criterion A1: Beingexposed to a traumatic event that involved physical threat; Criterion A2: Subjective reactionsof fear, helplessness or horror and, perhaps most important, Criterion F: Socialimpairment in dailyactivities). Examples of the ¢rst approach are the study by Schuster, Stein, Jaycox, Collins, Marshall, Elliott, Zhou, Kanouse, Morrison & Berry (2001) , the follow-up study by Stein, Elliott, Jaycox, Collins, Berry, Klein & Schuster (2004) , and the study of Herman, Felton & Susser, (2002) , after the September11terrorist attacks in the USA. These studies led to the very alarming ¢gures. However, a critical analysis of these studies may lead to di¡erent conclusions (Va¤ zquez, 2005) as all these Planning needs and services after collective trauma: should we look for the symptoms of PTSD? Intervention 2007, Volume 5, Number 1, Page 27 -40 studies used ad hoc de¢nitions of emotional consequences of traumatic events. Examples of the second strategy are the studies by Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin & Gil-Rivas (2002) or Blanchard, Kuhn, Rowell, Hickling, Wittrock & Rogers (2004) , also after the September 11 terrorist attacks, both using the PCL-C (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska & Keane, 1993) . For instance, using the PCL-C with a cut-o¡ score of 50, Schlenger, Caddell, Ebert, Jordan, Rourke, Wilson, et al., (2002) found that among their nationally representative sample of 2,273 adults, interviewed 1-2 months after the terrorist attacks on the USA of September 11, 2001, the overall rates of probable PTSD were 11.2% in New York City, 2.7% in Washington, D.C., 3.6% in major metropolitan areas, and 4% in the rest of the country. However, using a lower cut-o¡ score of 40 in the same instrument, Blanchard, et al. (2004) have published that the prevalence of probable PTSD for their university samples from Albany, Augusta, and North Dakota (thousands of kilometres away from New York) were, respectively, 11.3%,7.4% and 3.4%.When deciding which is the best cut-o¡ score for a questionnaire, the emphasis can be on sensitivity (maximizing detection of probably cases) or on speci¢city (what someone considered a 'case' is a true 'case'). Unfortunately, there is no agreement in the literature on the best cut-o¡ strategies, with values ranging from 40 to 50 (Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti & Rabalais, 2003) , and the choice of one or the other may lead to dramatically di¡erent results.
Help seeking behaviour
In spite of the rather apocalyptic announcements in the Spanish press, based on aprioristic considerations (theories or assumptions that cannotbe proven or disprovenby experience) by politicians, health authorities and certain academic sectors, subsequent data in the following year on mental health services showed clearly that there was only a slight increase in the demand for psychiatric consultation in Madrid. This result is clearly (Rosenheck & Fontana, 2003) . Also consistent with these ¢ndings, the data from large US managed, behavioural health organizations had similarly shown a pattern of no signi¢cant increases in prescription of psychotropic medications between September 2001 and January 2002 (McCarter & Goldman, 2002) . In a follow-up of a subsample of the RAND Corporation study (Stein, et al., 2004 ) the authors concluded that for the vast majority of people, family and friends were the main source for advice and talking, whereas only 11% sought some advice from the general health system, and there was almost no demand from the specialized mental heath system (Stein, et al., 2004) . This help seeking behaviour is re£ected in a study conducted in London three weeks after the 7 July 2005 bombings. These authors found out that less that 1% of 1.010 people interviewed felt that they needed professional help to deal with their emotional response to the attacks (Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson & Wessely, 2005 
Measures Initial reactions (Criterion A2, DSM-IV).
To explore whether di¡erent initial reactions could a¡ect the development of subsequent trauma-related symptoms, we used a 10-point rating scale (from 0 ¼ 'not at all' to 10 ¼ 'extreme intensity') on which participants rated the intensity of 'fear','feelings of horror' and 'helplessness' in the ¢rst hours after the trauma occurred. In addition to these three symptoms that make up DSM-IV Criterion A2 for PTSD (APA, 2000), we also examined other initial reactions that may play an important role in the developmentof PTSD, e.g., fear that someone known to the person could have been a¡ected, bodily symptoms such as sweating, trembling, feeling upset and anger. (Brewin, 2003; Bracha, Williams, Haynes, Kubany, Ralston & Yamashita, 2004) . Participants also rated the length in hours of these emotional reactions in the 24-hour period following the attacks. Post-traumatic symptoms (Criteria B, C and D, DSM-IV).The post traumatic stress disorder checklist^civilian version (PCL-C) is a 17-item self-report measure of post traumatic stress reactions that adequately covers the set of symptoms associated with PTSD as de¢ned in the DSM-IV (Weathers, et al., 1993 )Ĉ riteria B (re-experiencing), C (avoidance) and D (hyper-arousal). Items are scored on a
Planning needs and services after collective trauma: should we look for the symptoms of PTSD? Intervention 2007, Volume 5, Number 1, Page 27 -40 scale anchored from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).The possible range of scores is 17^65. 3 Similar to the majority of studies related to the September 11 events (e.g., Blanchard, et al., 2004) , questions were explicitly framed with respect to the March11terrorist attacks. The scores on the PCL-C were used in three di¡erent ways. a) Substantial stress level (SL).To compare our datawiththose fromprevious studies following the ¢rst mentioned strategy (Schuster, et al., 2001; Stein, et al., 2004; Matt & Vazquez, submitted) , SL was de¢ned as an answer of 4 ('quite a bit') or 5 ('extremely') to one or more of ¢ve PCL-C items. b) PCL-C total scores. Probably PTSD diagnosis. Following the second strategy, PCL total score and the three subscales that correspond to the DSM-IVCriteria B, C and D, respectively (APA, 1994), were computed. To determine rates of psychological distress related to PTSD according to the third strategy, three cut-o¡ scores di¡ering in restrictiveness were compared. b.1) Low threshold criterion (PCL total score >44). This criterion, which maximizes the detection of 'cases' increasing the risk of 'false cases' has been repeatedly used in epidemiological studies related to the September 11 attacks (Blanchard, et al., 2004) . b.2) High threshold criteria (PCL>50). A cut-o¡ score of 50 or above has also been used in national studies on the e¡ects of the September 11 attacks (Schlenger et al., 2002) . It limits the detection of 'cases' but increases the possibility that a'case' is really a'case' . b.3) High threshold criteria (PCL>50) with severity indicators. Even inthis case there is a high riskof 'false positives' . Scoring one or two ('very occasionally or 'occasionally'') in very unspeci¢c items like 'having nightmares' or 'avoiding situations related to the event' might not be considered as signi¢cant symptoms by a clinician in an interview. Yet, to reduce false positive cases it has been suggested by some authors (Ruggiero, et al., 2003) , that when looking for a PTSD diagnosis, it is advisable to compute items only when reaching a minimum severity threshold (i.e., a score of 4 or 5: 'quite a bit'or 'extremely', respectively). 4 c) Clinical criteria based on psychometric measures. Finally, based on the three strategies, we established a true DSM-IV-based strategy consisting of checking whether a given criterion was ful¢lled. Criterion A2 was considered to have been met when a participant responded with a score of 8 or above to any of the reactions described in DSM-IV (i.e., horror, fear, or helplessness). 5 Criteria B, C and D were considered to have been met whenever a participant met the number of symptoms required respectively for each criterion (one out of ¢ve re-experiencing symptoms, three out of seven avoidance symptoms, and two out of ¢ve hyperarousal symptoms). Presence of a symptom was de¢ned by a score of 4 or 5 on each corresponding PCL-C item. Criterion F was met if a participant scored 8 or above on the global functioning item. 6
Global functioning (Criterion F, DSM-IV). Problems in 'global functioning' (Criterion F for DSM-IV PTSD; APA, 2000) assessed the extent to which the March 11 events were still a¡ecting participants' daily activities at work, at home, or in interpersonal relations on a scale of 1 (not a¡ected in daily activities) to 10 (extremely a¡ected in daily activities).
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Results
Post traumatic stress responses (PCL-direct scores)
The mean PCL-C total score was 31.9 (Sd ¼12.9) (seeTable 2). An analysis of gender di¡erences showed that women had a more intense reaction than men, as re£ected in higher scores on the PCL-C total (t (487 Schuster, et al. (2001) . But, signi¢cantly enough, and coincident with previous studies, the mean magnitude of symptoms (M ¼1.88) did not even reach the severity threshold of 2 (i.e.'a little bit'). Second and third strategies: probable PTSD diagnosis based on psychometric measures. Table 2 shows the data on probable PTSD diagnosis based on PCL scores using di¡erent strategies. As can be seen, rates of PTSD signi¢cantly changed depending on which criterion was used. For the entire sample, using the cut-o¡ score >44 proposed by Blanchard, Hickling, Barton, Taylor, Loos & Jones-Alexander, (1996) , 13.3% of the sample were considered cases (i.e. having a probable PTSD disorder diagnosis), whereas the prevalence rate dropped to just 3.4% when the stricter criterion suggested by Ruggiero, et al. (2003) was used instead. Thus, applying di¡erent criteria commonly used in studies with the PCL-C resulted in a fourfold di¡erence between probable diagnostic rates. Approaching DSM-IVcriteria. The results were even more striking when data were calculated according to the approach modelled after DSM-IVcriteria. Only1.9% of the total sample received a probable diagnosis of PTSD; which means one out of every seven persons of the 'probable cases'using the standard PCL>44 strategy. Initial reactions and post traumatic response. With the exception of bodily symptoms (M ¼ 3.2), the average initial reaction was rather intense, ranging from M ¼ 6.0 ('fear') to M ¼ 7.5 ('helplessness'). This included the three symptoms of the DSM-IV de¢nition of Criterion A as well as other reactions (e.g., feelings of 'anger','fear that someone I know could be a¡ected', and feeling 'upset' about what happened).The average duration of the initial reaction was 1.9 hours and, in general, the intensity of these emotional reactions was signi¢cantly correlated with all the PCL-C scores (correlations between emotional reactions and PCL-C total score ranged from r ¼.54 for bodily symptoms to r ¼.32 for anger). The analysis of participants'global functioning revealed that, on a 0-10 scale, that the average impact was very low (M ¼ 3.7). Gender di¡erences revealed that, compared to men, women had more di⁄culties in daily activities (t (475) ¼ 4.27, p < 0.001; 3.84 vs. 3.32) in relation to the March 11 attacks.
Discussion
'Substantial stress' . As explained before, the strategies of using ad hoc questionnaires with rather super¢cial concepts like 'substantial stress' is a great source of confusion.This kind of instrument might lead to an overestimation of the epidemiological needs unless a careful analysis of the data and measurement strategies is previously made. However, the impact of these results in the mass media and the public in general is very important as they are often quoted, even in scienti¢c journals. It does not seem that these kinds of ¢gures, even if they are signi¢cant, correspond to a need for psychological intervention, or that they truly correspond with clinically signi¢cant conditions. This is especially the case in studies in which remarkably low diagnostic thresholds are used, or are based on self-report tools which may be very vulnerable to social desirability biases in the days following a collective disaster (North & Pfe¡erbaum,2002 (Southwick & Charney, 2004; Shalev, 2004) . 7 ' Acute stress disorder' . Based on the symptoms reported in a questionnaire, a preliminary study conducted by Mun‹ oz, et al. (2004 ) between 18-24 March 2004 showed that 47% of a Madrid general population sample (N ¼1,179) had an acute stress reaction in relation to the March 11attacks, as measured by the acute stress disorder scale (ASDS), (Bryant & Harvey, 2000) . Initial psychological reactions to the March 11 events were in some cases dramatic and, in fact, as our data showed, intense initial reactions (Criterion A2) were very common. Yet, there is also mounting evidence that these acute responses are limited in scope and quickly return to normal levels (Marshall, Spitzer, & Liebowitz, 1999; McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers 2003; Mun‹ oz, et al., 2004) . The transitory nature of traumatic stress responses found in the majority of the general population suggests that acute emotional distress should CarmeloVa¤ zquez & Pau Pe¤ rez-Sales not be mistaken for direct indicators of delayed PTSD. Furthermore, the overall magnitude of the general population's stress reaction is quite low. Both in our study, as in previous ones, the overall mean intensity of the PTSD symptoms was never above 2 in a 1-5 scale.
As McNally, et al. (2003) and Silver, et al. (2002) have argued, high initial emotional responses may be part of the natural recovery, improving without the assistance of professional help in the presence of supportive environments. Thus, a pattern of acute stress reactions after trauma in the hours, days or even weeks after a traumatic event occurs, should be cautiously interpreted (North & Pfe¡erbaum, 2002; Kilpatrick, Resnick, Freedy, Pelcovitz, Resick, Roth & van der Kolk,1998) .
The psychometric and the DSM-IV-R approaches
In the present study we used three di¡erent strategies to diagnose PTSD based on the PCL-C. Using two di¡erent scoring methods and a clinical approach, we found the prevalence rate dropped from 13.3% to 1.9%. Researchers and policy makers should pay attention to these enormous variations in probable prevalence rates (North & Pfe¡erbaum, 2002) , for an adequate and sensible planning of health services (Southwick & Charney, 2004 In these countries PTSD 12-month and lifetime prevalence rates are 0.9%-1.9%, respectively. These ¢gures from well controlled epidemiological studies suggest that ¢gures of probable PTSD in Madrid after the terrorist attacks seem to be not signi¢-cantly higher than those one can ¢nd in the generalpopulation under normal conditions. Additionally, it must be stressed that the ESEMeD estimated prevalence for PTSD are quite a lot lower than those found in comparable US studies (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson, 1995) . Future studies should pay attention to the possibility of directly comparing the ¢gures on psychological reactions to traumatic events in di¡erent countries and cultures. Our ¢ndings portray a response to these traumatic events that is consistent with other research, showing a dramatic surge in some emotional symptoms immediately following a collective disaster with little, if any, implication for psychopathology in the general population (McNally, et al., 2003) Yet, the pattern of results of the magnitude of the response calls for the need to be cautious of the dangers of confounding normal emotional distress with clinically signi¢cant disorders, especially when using psychometric criteria as the main source of data. We want to stress that this is not an epidemiological study that aimed to derive a prevalence of PTSD in the population of Madrid after the 11 March attacks. The non-random nature of our general population sample prevents us from doing that. This was not the central purpose of our paper, but to provide some critical hints on the limitations of methods that intend to screen for mental disorders in the general population after a collective disaster. In our opinion, epidemiological estimates of similar studies should be carefully examined, as variations in diagnostic cut-o¡ scores and strategies may have dramatic e¡ects on the resulting estimates and conclusions. Of course, following our argumentation and considering the table that summarizes approaches and results, the no-impact hypothesis seems the more plausible, but the present study cannot be considered a robust epidemiological research for this purpose. The recent experiences of September 11 (New York and Washington DC), March 11 (Madrid) and July 7 (London) have shown us that there is a true danger in the idea of an 'epidemic' of PTSD that is constructed after a collective disaster, although we now know that there is no scienti¢c basis for this assumption. It might be hypothesized that, in some cases, politicians might be interested in the political advantage of fear, health authorities in the possibility of becoming very important and receiving extra amounts of funds or personnel, the press because the idea of 'trauma' has more acceptance and sells better than the idea of resuming normalcy and resilience, and NGOs because the PTSD ¢gures might be of great help for justifying claims for funds from donors. This could be a very dangerous and misleading cocktail that should warn researchers to be very cautious and strict in their methodologies and assertions. This cautionary approach in the understanding of the consequences of stressful experiences in the general population by no means denies the impact of those experiences on survivors and witnesses who may have real needs and demands which are not addressed speci¢cally by our study. However, even admitting this impact in selected samples, it is also under discussion whether a PTSD model of trauma is useful to understand the reaction of directly a¡ected people. The usefulness of the PTSD model may also be questioned for many other reasons: it does not contribute to understanding the problems within a cultural and socio-political context Mun‹ oz, et al. (2004) in the ¢rst days after the attacks seemed to support this prediction. The authors reported that 47% of the population presented 'symptoms related to Acute Stress Disorder' using the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS) in a sample of 1179 citizens of Madrid. Although the authors were cautious in interpreting their results, press interviews echoed the results uncritically. Miguel-Tobal, et al. (2004) conducted a study following the same methodology as that of Galea, et al. (2002) ) from a second wave, 6 months after the attacks, that showed ¢gures close to what would be expected in normal conditions (2.5% prevalence of major depression, 1% PTSD and 3% panic attacks among general population) although the authors discussed the data in terms of 'chroni¢ca-tion'of symptoms, something also quoted in press (i.e., LaVanguardia, next day). Thus, the idea of an 'epidemic' of PTSD was somehow constructed and fed. It might be hypothesized that there are multiple interests in this construction process: politicians canbe interested in the political advantages of inducing fear in the population, health authorities in the possibility of getting funds or personnel, the press in the idea that 'trauma' has CarmeloVa¤ zquez & Pau Pe¤ rez-Sales more acceptance and sells better than news on resuming normalcy and, ¢nally, scienti¢c authors may also contribute by being seduced by the idea of public notoriety. All in all, a very dangerous cocktail. 2 We conducted a series of analyses comparing PCL-C scores in both samples ¢nding no signi¢-cant di¡erences in any PCL scale. Thus, both samples were combined in this report.
3 Test^retest reliability at 2-3 days has been reported at 0.96 (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska & Keane, 1993) and the overall diagnostic e⁄-ciency has been found to be acceptably high at 0.90 (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley & Forneris,1996) . In our study, the scale revealed to be highly consistent (Cronbach's a = .89).
4 A score of 3 or above is required for items 1, 2, 9, 10, 12 and 15, whereas a score of 4 or above is required for the rest of the items.
5 A score of 8 or above in a 1-10 scale would be equivalent to a score of 4 or above in the 1-5 scale of the PCL-C.
6 Criterion E (duration of symptom more than 1 month) was not directly assessed as this study was conducted between the third and fourth week after the attacks. Thus, the responses covered a 3-4 week period as the PCL instructions asked subjects to rate the severity of symptoms since March 11.
7 Similar variations in results have been found when researchers have studied initial psychological reactions with the controversial category of acute stress disorder (ASD)^see Va¤ zquez (2005). This new category was ¢rst introduced in the DSM-IV (APA, 1996)^see a systematic critical review by Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz, 1999^to cover the measurement of psychological reactions to traumatic events within the ¢rst 30 days after a traumatic event.
